The Balance of Power in Ukraine and Deterrence Effectiveness Against Nuclear-Armed Russia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18485/Keywords:
deterrence, balance of power, Ukraine, Russia, nuclear weaponsAbstract
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has raised several significant questions regarding the impact of deterrence, the European balance of power and the ability of current security frameworks to restrict the actions of nuclear-armed revisionist powers. This paper uses an integrated theoretical framework consisting of deterrence theory, the balance of power theory, the security dilemma and neorealism to analyze the dynamic relationships between Russia, Ukraine and the Western alliance. The primary contribution of the paper is to develop a comprehensive analytical framework to evaluate the relationship between different aspects of deterrence (i.e., to prevent an initial attack, to limit further escalation and to preclude the use of nuclear weapons) and the relative performance of each within the context of nuclear asymmetrical. The paper employs qualitative analysis of secondary literature, policy documents and empirical developments since 2014 to evaluate the extent to which Western military, economic and informational strategies to deter Russia have been successful, and Russia's corresponding adaptations including nuclear signaling and hybrid escalation. The paper demonstrates that while deterrence was ineffective in stopping Russia's initial attack on Ukraine, it has been somewhat effective in restricting further escalation, preserving NATO's territorial integrity and in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. However, the paper also demonstrates that the conflict highlights the inherent structural limitations of deterrence and the balance of power approach when used to protect non-member states from nuclear coercion. Overall, the Ukraine conflict provides clear evidence of the ongoing relevance and the growing constraints of classical realist frameworks in the face of increasingly complex and dangerous forms of conflict. Furthermore, the paper identifies the need for new approaches to deterrence and defense planning that consider the increasing complexity of the international security environment.
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