A Nuclear Policy Framework: Identifying Challenges and Ways to Solutions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18485/fb_ijcss.2025.1.2.2Keywords:
nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free-zone, nuclear policy, disarmament framework, conventional strategic deterrent, nuclear intelligenceAbstract
This article explores the possibility of restructuring current nuclear policy frameworks to address the evolving landscape of global politics and the challenges posed by nuclear proliferation. Currently, many nuclear treaties and arrangements are weakening due to inherent structural flaws. Disarmament efforts between major nuclear powers have been stalled, non-proliferation efforts have failed, and most Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones lack universal recognition, particularly from the United States. Meanwhile, central nuclear states are investing heavily in their nuclear modernization programmes. Despite this turbulent environment, policymakers and the public often appear relaxed, assuming that the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 guarantees their continued role as a deterrent rather than a weapon of war. While many perceptions regarding non-use of nuclear weapons seem logical, it is imprudent to ignore the current realities. Scholars like Herman Kahn have predicted a significant possibility of limited nuclear warfare in the future, and his arguments align closely with the current global nuclear scenario. This paper examines contemporary nuclear problems- such as its growing popularity and availability, and the policies and frameworks that have indirectly contributed to non-proliferation and disarmament. Finally, it also presents several solutions to address contemporary nuclear challenges, directly or indirectly. These include bringing unrecognised nuclear-armed states (for example, India and Israel) under the ambit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, restructuring Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone agreements to reflect political realities, and adopting a ratio-based disarmament system. Together, these steps are among the solutions advanced in this research paper.
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