The Role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in Nuclear Disarmament Verification
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18485/Keywords:
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), Nuclear Verification, Nuclear DisarmamentAbstract
This research explores the key role of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in nuclear disarmament verification, showing their significant contributions through normative advocacy, technical innovations, and multilateral cooperation. This paper applies a multi-approach, which includes looking into major treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), to highlight the NNWS’s initiative in promoting norms, advancing technical contributions, and building the regional framework. South Africa’s voluntary disarmament is a case study for evaluating the current verification regime. The research highlights the NNWS's contributions and challenges. The key findings highlight the NNWS as a proactive force that shapes disarmament norms and advocates for technologies through different initiatives. The paper also identifies key challenges, including political resistance, technical limitations, and institutional barriers. Policy recommendations include strengthening verification mechanisms, leveraging emerging technologies such as zero-knowledge proofs, and increasing trust-based transparency to increase multilateral collaboration and advance global disarmament goals. The research highlights the transformative potential of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.
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