United States–Republic of Korea Joint Nuclear Defense Guidelines: Evaluating Alliance Coordination Against the North Korean Threat
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18485/Keywords:
nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, alliance coordination, crisis management, security in Northeast AsiaAbstract
The 2023 United States-Republic of Korea Joint Nuclear Defense Guidelines, as a subsidiary document to the Republic of Korea-United States General Security of Military Information Agreements and based on the United States Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, contemplate strengthening the extended deterrence in the face of North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile threat. The guidelines institutionalize cooperation between the two allies in nuclear planning, intelligence sharing, and crisis management. This article examines their strategic implications for nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, and alliance theory. The research is based on a qualitative systematic review of official policy documents, defence white papers, joint communiqués, and secondary academic literature. It adopts a theory-based analysis framework, drawing on classical and modern deterrence theory and alliance institutionalism, to examine shifts in coordination, credibility, and crisis stability. The guidelines bolster deterrence credibility through institutionalized consultative mechanisms, deeper integration of intelligence, and an enhanced joint military exercise program. Institutionalized nuclear consultation enhances interoperability and signals resolve, thereby reducing uncertainty in crises. However, closer integration also poses challenges for managing escalation and could exacerbate regional security dilemmas, especially in Northeast Asia’s multipolar strategic environment. It can be concluded that the guidelines constitute a substantial development in alliance nuclear governance, as they operationalize extended deterrence commitments. They bolster both preparedness and alliance cohesion, but continued diplomatic engagement and tailored signaling are necessary to avoid inadvertent escalation. The study adds to discussions on managing nuclear alliances and can inform policy on crisis stability in Northeast Asia.
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